CONTEXT Time pressure has been implicated in the suboptimal diagnostic performance of doctors and in increases in diagnostic errors. However, the reasons underlying these effects are not clear. The aim of this study was to investigate the influence of time pressure on physicians' diagnostic accuracy and to explore the mediating effects of perceived stress (emotional pathway) and number of plausible diagnostic hypotheses (cognitive pathway) on the proposed relationship.
Moeber M Mahzari, 4 Ghassan A Al-Ghamdi 4 & Henk G Schmidt 5 CONTEXT Time pressure has been implicated in the suboptimal diagnostic performance of doctors and in increases in diagnostic errors. However, the reasons underlying these effects are not clear. The aim of this study was to investigate the influence of time pressure on physicians' diagnostic accuracy and to explore the mediating effects of perceived stress (emotional pathway) and number of plausible diagnostic hypotheses (cognitive pathway) on the proposed relationship.
METHODS We conducted a randomised controlled experiment. A total of 75 senior internal medicine residents completed eight written clinical cases under conditions with (n = 40) or without (n = 35) time pressure. They were then asked to: (i) rate the overall stress experienced, and (ii) write down any alternative hypotheses they had thought of when diagnosing the cases. In a post hoc analysis, a mediation path analysis was performed to test the causal relationships between time pressure, perceived stress and number of alternative diagnoses.
RESULTS Participants who were under time pressure spent less time diagnosing the cases (85.54 seconds versus 181.81 seconds; p< 0.001) and had a lower mean diagnostic accuracy score (0.44 versus 0.53; p = 0.01). In addition, they reported more stress (5.80 versus 4.69; p = 0.01) and generated fewer plausible tentative hypotheses (0.37 versus 0.51; p = 0.01). Two path coefficients were found to be statistically significant; the first path coefficient referred to the relationship between time pressure and perceived stress (standardised b = 0.25, p = 0.029), and the second negative path coefficient referred to the relationship between time pressure and number of plausible alternative hypotheses (standardised b = À0.32, p< 0.01).
CONCLUSIONS Time pressure adversely influences physicians' diagnostic accuracy by increasing their stress response and reducing the number of plausible hypotheses as mediators.
INTRODUCTION
Medicine is a highly demanding profession. Physicians face daily challenges in a high-pressure environment in which they must make critical decisions and potentially life-changing choices. In most situations, these physicians have long working hours, heavy administrative loads and restricted time for patient visits. 1,2 They often feel they do not have enough time to spend with patients. 3 This kind of busy practice has negative effects not only on patients, but also on health care providers. For example, time pressure has been shown to be associated with fatigue, burnout and low job satisfaction among physicians. 1, [3] [4] [5] Long working hours and excessive workloads may have serious consequences for patient safety. For example, Linzer et al. 2 showed that the quality of care provided was lower among time-pressured physicians. Moreover, the present authors found that the negative effects of time pressure could extend to physicians' diagnostic performance. Using clinical vignettes, we showed that senior internal medicine residents committed more diagnostic errors when they were put under time pressure compared with a control group. 6 Although these results suggest that time constraints can reduce the quality of diagnosis, other studies did not show this effect, but instead suggested that quick processing does not necessarily lead to diagnostic error. 7, 8 The purpose of this study was therefore, to replicate the negative effects of time pressure on diagnostic accuracy in a different sample of physicians. In addition, we were interested in the reasons why these effects arise. In particular, we wished to identify possible pathways that mediate between the experience of pressure and poor diagnostic performance.
To investigate the mechanisms underlying the effects of time pressure, it is useful to consider the thinking processes underlying clinical diagnosis. Typically, during the diagnostic process, the physician collects the patient's information (signs and symptoms), generates likely explanations (i.e. tentative hypotheses), critically evaluates them and then reaches a final diagnosis. A theory often called upon to provide a framework for understanding diagnostic reasoning is dual-process theory. 9 As the theory postulates, diagnostic decision making is a function of both heuristic intuitions and analytic deliberation. The former is called System 1 thinking, whereas the latter is called System 2 thinking. A key difference between the two systems concerns the speed of processing. System 1 thinking is fast and implicit and uses heuristics and parallel processes that generate hypotheses automatically from long-term memory with minimal effort. System 2 thinking, by contrast, is slow, explicit and evaluative, requires the effortful use of working memory and is constrained by the latter's limited capacity. In most diagnostic tasks, System 1 reasoning allows physicians to intuitively and rapidly formulate diagnostic hypotheses and management options. These intuitively produced hypotheses will then be confirmed or ruled out analytically through System 2 processes. 9, 10 It is expected that the intuitive system dominates the diagnosis of routine cases associated with a higher level of certainty, particularly when time is limited. By contrast, if a case is atypical and difficult, processing slows down and analytical processes are engaged. As noted, the interaction between the two systems is dynamic.
However, time pressure may disrupt the dynamic interaction between the two reasoning systems controlling the diagnostic task, leading to diagnostic failure. Yet, the mechanisms underlying this harmful effect are not clear. We argue here that at least two pathways, an emotional and a cognitive pathway, alone or in concert, mediate the effect of time pressure on diagnostic accuracy. Time pressure may increase emotional stress levels, leading to mistakes. Alternatively, time pressure may cause a reduction in the number and relevance of tentative hypotheses, increasing the likelihood that the correct diagnosis will not be generated.
A number of studies have argued that time pressure (i.e. imposed by the introduction of a deadline as a stressor) changes a person's emotional state and have shown that increasing the urgency of a deadline increases stress levels. 11, 12 This kind of time-related stress may have negative effects on diagnostic accuracy. Several studies (although not in medicine) have suggested that being under stress influences cognitive functions in different ways. For example, Keinan et al. 13 found that stress adversely affects decision-making strategies and that participants shifted to simpler problem-solving strategies, such as heuristics, when they were put under stress. Another study found a correlation between the cortisol stress response and risky choices.
14 Moreover, some studies have suggested that stress creates a state of worry, which affects performance on cognitive tasks. 15, 16 In fact, one study showed that when an individual is under stress, increased attention to the stressor depletes cognitive capacity, which impairs judgement. 17 Therefore, stress may affect reasoning in potentially deleterious ways.
However, time pressure can also simply restrict the number and relevance of tentative diagnostic hypotheses. In a previous study, we demonstrated that physicians under time pressure spend on average 37% less time on a case than those not under pressure. 6 As tentative hypotheses are retrieved from long-term memory, they are maintained in an active state in working memory. Only hypotheses actively maintained in working memory seem to affect the downstream processes of decision making. 18 It is therefore likely that under time pressure, the process of generating and checking hypotheses does not fully unfold and the number of tentative hypotheses considered is thereby reduced. Some even suggest that under time pressure, physicians rely to an even greater extent on heuristics to diagnose patients, which causes them to ignore important hypotheses. 10 In this study, we empirically examined the effects of time pressure on physicians' diagnostic accuracy, when measuring the amount of perceived stress and recording the number of plausible tentative hypotheses produced in the process.
METHODS

Design
The study was a randomised controlled experiment. The study protocol was approved by the institutional review board of the National Guard Health Affairs, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, after ethical review. The study was conducted between December 2015 and November 2016. The independent variable was time pressure (i.e. time pressure versus no time pressure), and the dependent variables were response time, diagnostic accuracy, self-reported stress and number of plausible alternative hypotheses.
Setting and participants
The participants were senior internal medicine residents, enrolled from two teaching hospitals in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, namely King Abdulaziz Medical City and King Khalid University Hospital.
The residency programme in internal medicine in Saudi Arabia covers general internal medicine and medical specialties that are taken for an average of 4 years of training. The programme consists of two phases in which first-and second-year trainees are categorised as 'junior residents', and third-and fourth-year trainees are categorised as 'senior residents'. Initially, the principal investigator recruited all third-and fourth-year internal medicine residents rotating in these two hospitals by sending them e-mails. The e-mail included an invitation to join a study aimed at understanding the nature of clinical problem solving. In view of the nature of the study, the real intent of the experiment was not revealed to the participants until they had completed the study. The experiment was conducted in eight sessions over the course of 7 months.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. The time pressure group comprised 40 participants, and the control group (not subjected to time pressure) comprised 35 participants. Participation was voluntary and all participants provided written informed consent. None of the participants received any financial incentive.
Materials
Participants diagnosed eight written clinical vignettes with the following diagnoses: hyperthyroidism; pseudomembranous colitis; Addison's disease; inflammatory bowel disease; acute viral hepatitis; liver cirrhosis; acute appendicitis, and aortic dissection.
Each of the vignettes consisted of a description of the patient's medical history, present complaints, findings of a physical examination and test results. An example is presented in Table 1 . All cases were based on real patients with confirmed diagnoses and had been used in previous studies with internal medicine residents, 6, 19 which allowed us to select cases that had been shown to be of an intermediate level of complexity. Cases were presented to the participants online using QUALTRICS software (Qualtrics, LLC, Provo, UT, USA), a web-based testing system.
Procedure
The study took place in the computer laboratories located within each of the designated hospitals. Participants in both groups were randomly seated and asked to read through the study instructions provided on their computer screens. All participants were instructed to work individually in silence and to avoid any interruptions by telephone calls. Participants were not allowed to consult any resources.
Once the participants started, they were asked to enter demographic information including subject number, age, sex, year of graduation and number of years in clinical practice. Subsequently, they were informed that the experiment comprised two parts. In the first part, participants were asked to diagnose the electronically presented clinical case by entering the most likely diagnosis in the available space. The second part was to be explained after the first part had been completed. On-screen instructions were provided according to the study condition.
For the first part of the experiment (diagnosis of the clinical cases), the instructions for the time pressure condition read as follows:
This study is concerned with an issue that all doctors face in their daily practice: lack of time. There are usually more patients to be seen than there is time available. We are interested in exploring whether providing feedback about the pace of their work (relative to what remains to be done) would help doctors deal with time constraints. Therefore, you will receive, after each case you have diagnosed, information about how much work still needs to be done and how much time is left for doing it. If time is running short, you can adapt by working your way faster through the next cases. It helps if you actively imagine yourself in a busy emergency room. There is a large number of patients to be seen during the rest of your shift, and only very limited time left. You will probably not be able to see all the cases, but try to work quickly, without compromising accuracy. Please do your best to solve as many cases as possible.
Time pressure perception was manipulated visually by the automatic display of two bars after each case. A green bar represented the number of cases still to be seen and a red bar showed the amount of time left. The two bars were designed not to be linked in any way with participant performance, but to encourage participants to work as fast as they could. Additionally, written feedback given under the two bars indicated that the participant was progressively falling behind schedule (regardless of performance). This procedure had been used successfully in a previous study. 6 After completing the first part of the study, participants were asked to rate the overall amount of stress they had experienced when they were solving the cases on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 'I felt extremely calm and relaxed' to 'I felt extremely stressed'.
In the no time pressure condition, participants were requested to diagnose the clinical cases without any time restriction. At the end of the first part of the experiment, they were asked to rate their level of stress using the same Likert-based stress scale as the experimental group.
In the second part of the study (review of the diagnosed cases), participants in both the experimental and control groups were given the Table 1 Example of a case (correct diagnosis: Addison's disease) used with third-and fourth-year internal medicine residents in the time pressure (n = 40) and no time pressure (n = 35) conditions A 45-year-old man presents with complaints of nausea, vomiting and diarrhoea of 1 week's duration. The patient has had fatigue, malaise, anorexia and episodes of abdominal cramps over the past 6 months. He also complains of dizziness and a fainting sensation when rising from bed in the morning, and describes decreased sexual interest. He has lost 9 kg of weight over the last 4 months.
Physical examination:
The patient is dehydrated and emaciated. His skin is dark on 
Imaging tests:
Chest X-ray: no abnormalities.
Abdominal X-ray: bilateral calcification in the adrenal glands. BP = blood pressure; ECG = electrocardiogram; Hb = haemoglobin; Ht = haematocrit. same instructions. They were shown the first and second lines of each case (which included details of the patient's age, gender and main complaint) with the diagnosis they had provided during the first part and asked to write down which, if any, other possible diagnoses had crossed their minds when diagnosing the case. Time was not constrained in this part of the experiment.
In both conditions of the experiment, participants were given the chance to practise on one example case before diagnosing the actual cases. All participants diagnosed the same set of cases, but in random order. After completing the session, participants were not informed about the correct diagnoses and were asked not to speak to their colleagues about the cases until the end of the study. Case response time, final diagnosis, tentative hypotheses and stress level were recorded in QUALTRICS and exported as data files.
Analysis
Participants' diagnoses and hypotheses in both the first and second parts of the study were scored independently by two board-certified experts in internal medicine (MMM and GAA-G), who were blinded to the experimental condition under which they had been given.
In the first part of the experiment, the diagnosis provided by each participant for each case was scored according to its accuracy as correct, partially correct or incorrect, receiving scores of 1, 0.5 and 0, respectively. A diagnosis was considered correct when the core correct diagnosis was given by the participant (e.g. 'acute hepatitis' in a case of 'acute viral hepatitis'). When the diagnosis was not correct but one component of the diagnosis was mentioned, the diagnosis was classified as partially correct (e.g. 'sepsis' in a case of 'pneumonia with sepsis'). Finally, when the diagnosis written by the participant did not fall into one of these categories, the diagnosis was considered incorrect (e.g. 'ectopic pregnancy' in a case of 'acute appendicitis'). Scoring consensus was achieved in 85% of diagnoses and discrepancies were resolved through discussion. This procedure was identical to that used in the previous study by ALQahtani et al. 6 In the second part of the experiment, the generated tentative hypotheses were simply scored by counting the number of possible diagnoses written for each case. Only plausible new diagnoses were counted. Inter-rater agreement was 84% and disagreements were resolved through discussion.
We performed separate one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to determine differences between experimental conditions in mean response time, mean diagnostic accuracy, mean stress level and mean number of plausible tentative hypotheses generated. The significance level was set at p = 0.05 for all comparisons. IBM â SPSS â Version 24.0 for Mac (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY, USA) was used for the analyses. In a post hoc analysis, a mediation path analysis was conducted to explore the causal relationships between time pressure, perceived stress and number of alternative diagnoses. 20 (It was not possible to include diagnostic accuracy as the dependent variable because its scores were obtained before stress level and number of alternative diagnoses were measured.) The model is depicted in Fig. 1 .
This model allowed us to generate path coefficients (standardised regression weights) to explore the extent to which time pressure and stress have an effect on generating plausible alternatives. Thus, a number of hypotheses can be tested. For instance, if Path B and Path C are significant and sizable, but Path A is not significant, it would suggest that there is a direct and independent effect of stress level and time pressure on the generation of plausible alternative hypotheses. Alternatively, it is possible that only time pressure has a direct effect on the generation of plausible alternative hypotheses. If so, this would be indicated by a significant and sizable Path C (and possibly Path A as time pressure is expected to induce stress), but no significant Path B. Finally, it is also conceivable that stress level is a mediator between time pressure and number of plausible hypotheses generated. In such a case, significant and sizable factor loadings for Paths A and B, but not Path C, would be expected. The analysis was conducted using IBM 
RESULTS
A total of 75 senior internal medicine residents participated in this study. They were randomly assigned into two groups (time pressure versus no time pressure). Their demographic characteristics are presented in Table 2 . After randomisation, no significant differences emerged between the two groups in terms of age, sex or years of clinical practice. All participants completed the same eight cases. Table 3 shows mean response times in both conditions. There was a highly significant difference between the experimental and control groups as determined by one-way ANOVA (F (1,73) = 34.89, p< 0.001). This finding validates our time pressure manipulation; participants in the time pressure condition diagnosed cases twice as fast as those in the control group. Table 3 presents the mean scores for participants' diagnostic accuracy in each case under both conditions. There was a significant difference between the time pressure group and the control group as shown by one-way ANOVA (F (1,73) = 5.83, p = 0.01). These results suggest the participants in the time pressure condition committed more mistakes than those in the control group. Table 4 shows the mean scores for stress reported by participants in both conditions. The findings suggest that participants in the time pressure condition were more stressed than participants in the control condition (F (1,73) = 4.701, p = 0.05).
Response time
Diagnostic accuracy
Stress level (the emotional pathway)
Tentative hypotheses (the cognitive pathway) Table 4 presents the mean number of plausible alternative hypotheses generated by participants in both conditions. One-way ANOVA revealed that the group under time pressure produced fewer plausible differential diagnoses than the control group (F (1,73) = 6.521, p = 0.01).
Mediation path model
The results of the mediation analysis are depicted in Fig. 2 . The results suggest that only two path coefficients were statistically significant. The first was the path coefficient from time pressure to perceived stress (standardised b = 0.25, p = 0.029); more time pressure led to higher levels of stress. The second significant negative path coefficient (standardised b = À0.32, p< 0.01) referred to the effect of time pressure on the number of plausible alternative hypotheses; more time pressure led to a significantly lower number of plausible alternative hypotheses. Finally, there was no significant association between stress and the number of alternative hypotheses (standardised b = 0.15, p = 0.19).
DISCUSSION
This study examined the effects of time pressure on physicians' diagnostic accuracy as well as the mechanisms mediating these effects. We hypothesised that the group with time pressure would spend less time diagnosing the cases and make more diagnostic mistakes than the control group. In addition, we argued that time pressure Figure 1 Mediation model of the causal relationships between time pressure, stress and number of plausible diagnoses generated leads to restrictions in the diagnostic reasoning process, possibly mediated by a stress response (an emotional pathway), the production of fewer and less adequate tentative hypotheses (a cognitive pathway), or both. To test these hypotheses, eight written clinical vignettes were diagnosed following instructions that encouraged time pressure or no time pressure conditions.
Our results are largely consistent with the hypotheses put forward in this study. Participants in the time pressure condition spent less time (less than half) diagnosing the cases than participants in the control group (86 seconds and 182 seconds, respectively). This result suggests that the time pressure intervention was successful. Furthermore, diagnostic accuracy was negatively affected under time pressure; participants made more mistakes when faced with time pressure. Therefore, the results of this study provide additional evidence of the negative effects of time pressure on diagnostic accuracy. Some studies have failed to find negative effects of time pressure on diagnostic accuracy. 7, 8, 21 This discrepancy with the present results has been explained at length in a previous paper. 6 Although the evidence in the medical literature concerning the effects of time pressure on physicians' diagnostic accuracy is contradictory, converging evidence from the psychology domain is in line with the findings of the current study. Based on dual-process theory, 9 if individuals lack sufficient time to process information fully, they rely on System 1 (non-analytical, heuristics) thinking more than on System 2 (analytical, evaluative) reasoning. Time pressure seems to be a context in which an Table 3 Response time and diagnostic accuracy scores generated by 75 third-and fourth-year internal medicine residents diagnosing eight clinical cases in the time pressure (experimental) or no time pressure (control) conditions information overload or a lack of processing opportunity occurs, leading to the automatic nonanalytical processing of information. Dependence on this kind of System 1 thinking can generate biases that may reduce diagnostic accuracy. For example, studies in which participants were asked to respond quickly found their answers to be dominated by heuristically generated biases. [22] [23] [24] Moreover, several studies have shown that under time pressure, stereotyping 25 and risky decision making 26 emerge. It should be noted that the cases used in the present study were of an intermediate level of difficulty, as shown by the mean scores for diagnostic accuracy (44-54%); when cases are not straightforward, excessive reliance on System 1 reasoning tends to decrease accuracy 9 because an initial hypothesis that is wrong (the likelihood of this increases with case difficulty) cannot be repaired if System 2 thinking is not engaged.
In the current study, we examined possible mediating mechanisms moderating the effects of time pressure. We investigated two possible pathways: an emotional and a cognitive pathway. For the emotional pathway, we explored the role of stress as a mediating factor of time pressure. The results of the mediation analysis demonstrated that participants in the time pressure condition were more stressed when diagnosing the cases compared with the control group. Perhaps this kind of negative emotional state experienced by the time pressure group underlies their poor diagnostic performance. In fact, these findings direct our attention to the link between emotional and cognitive functioning. Several studies have shown the effects of stress on memory, knowledge retrieval and attention. [27] [28] [29] For instance, stress-induced cortisol levels have been found to correlate with reckless decisions and poor memory performance. 14, 30 Furthermore, stress adversely influences decision-making performance: participants under stress who were asked to solve problems were found to adopt simpler strategies by shifting to heuristics and relying more on shallow rather than evaluated information. 13 Interestingly, the path model also demonstrated that the level of stress experienced was not a significant factor in determining how many alternative diagnoses were generated. Only time pressure had a significant negative direct effect on this variable. Thus, stress cannot be seen as a mediator in the relationship between time pressure and the number of alternative diagnostic hypotheses generated. Put simply, the imposition of time pressure on a physician results in greater stress and, independently of that, also in a reduction in the number of possible alternative hypotheses that can be generated caused by lack of available time.
What do these findings signify? Present formulations of dual-process theory 9 seem to suggest that time pressure hinders time-consuming System 2 analysis, thereby preventing the thoughtful examination of initial hypotheses that can lead to the recognition of contradictions and the generation of new hypotheses. However, another possible explanation is that time pressure may also influence System 1 processing. Time constraints may restrict the number and quality of the hypotheses generated initially. If these premises are fewer in number and less relevant to the patient problem, the diagnostic process as a whole will be compromised. In support of this notion, a number of studies have found that time pressure truncates the process of hypothesis generation, leading to the retrieval of fewer hypotheses from long-term memory. 31, 32 However, not only the number of initially generated hypotheses may be restricted. The thoughtful analysis part of the clinical reasoning process itself often produces new hypotheses to be tested subsequently. If System 2 reasoning is negatively affected, this may in turn restrict the number and quality of System 1-generated hypotheses in the course of the process. We have found evidence that appears to support this idea. Participants who were required to process the cases under time constraints subsequently remembered 14% fewer diagnostic hypotheses. In addition, these hypotheses were of poorer quality. However, because of the nature of the interaction between System 1 and System 2 reasoning, 9 neither effect can be effectively isolated, at least not within the limits of the present study design. In summary, time pressure seems to influence not only System 2 but also System 1 thinking, although future research is required to verify this.
Some authors believe that stress is an intervening variable here. Mandler, for instance, found that when participants were put under stress, the range of alternatives available for decision making and the dimensions considered for each of those decisions became significantly restricted. 17 Moreover, research suggests that being under stress affects one's working memory capacity. 33 Apparently, part of the individual's attention is devoted to the stressor, thereby leaving insufficient capacity to deal with the cognitive task at hand. This could lead to inadequate consideration of alternatives, which is suggested to be a defence mechanism against information overload. 17 Another study found that when participants were exposed to stress, they solved problems in a non-systematic way without scanning all relevant alternatives. 34 These analyses seem to suggest that stress limits the capacity to generate appropriate hypotheses, implying that the more stress imposed, the fewer hypotheses are generated. Such a state of affairs was represented by the mediation model in our study. However, we found no evidence to support this notion. It appears that emotion and cognition are both independently affected by time pressure.
We mentioned earlier in this paper that evidence of the adverse effects of time pressure on diagnostic accuracy is inconclusive. In the light of our current findings, we argue that some studies may fail to elicit the stress response in participants under time pressure that would lead to observable effects on diagnostic performance. Research has shown that time perception is subjective and influenced by how individuals experience the passage of time. 35 Time-urgent individuals were found to overestimate the passage of time, which caused them to experience added pressure. 36 Alternatively, individuals with low time urgency may handle time pressure more effectively as they do not waste cognitive resources on worrying about time. Therefore, exposing participants to time constraints does not necessarily lead to time pressure or stress, which may explain the variations in the results reported by different studies.
The present study has some limitations. Firstly, because of the way in which the experiment was designed, we were not able to directly relate the amount of perceived stress and the number of diagnostic hypotheses produced to final diagnostic accuracy. This would have required us to test participants with regard to these variables when they were solving each case and prior to the final diagnosis. We contemplated this idea but eventually rejected it as it would have slowed down the reasoning process and possibly have interfered with the experimental manipulation. Secondly, we recruited participants with limited experience; it is unclear whether more experienced physicians would be equally affected by pressure imposed by time constraints. In our previous study, 6 time pressure did not influence the diagnostic performance of more experienced residents to the same extent. Therefore, unlike a novice doctor, an experienced physician may react differently to time pressure. For example, a physician who has practised for several years has a greater reserve of hypotheses stored in his or her long-term memory that can be readily activated during a case encounter. Weber et al. 37 found a relationship between years of medical experience and hypothesis generation. Further studies may investigate whether time pressure influences the diagnostic performance of experienced physicians during problem solving to a similar extent. Thirdly, the way we measured participants' stress was indirect. Future research might utilise more authentic measures, such as cortisol levels. 38 Finally, this study was conducted under laboratory settings using written clinical cases, which restricts the generalisability of its findings to real clinical environments, such as busy outpatient clinics. Nevertheless, clinical vignettes were compared favourably with other methods, such as simulated patients and medical record abstraction. 39, 40 They proved to be a valid and reliable approach for measuring physicians' clinical decisions. 41, 42 Moreover, the stress reported by participants when solving clinical scenarios under time pressure may differ from the stress experienced in a real clinical context. However, it is possible that stress induced by real-life events will be higher, and thereby have stronger effects, than the stress produced by manipulations such as that used in the present study.
Ultimately, many decisions in clinical practice must be made under stressful conditions such as time pressure. Therefore, engaging physicians in educational activities to prepare them for situations in which time pressure is a factor may be useful. Such training can make physicians more aware of the potential reductions in diagnostic accuracy and hypothesis generation that occur under time pressure, and the ability of training to help to minimise the negative effects of time pressure should be investigated.
In summary, our findings suggest that making diagnoses under time pressure may result in distortions in hypothesis generation, the evaluation of available alternatives and the production of an accurate final diagnosis. By highlighting the factors mediating the observed negative impact of time pressure on the diagnostic accuracy of doctors, we hope to encourage health care organisations to seek strategies that will ensure both the optimal performance of their systems and the delivery of high-quality care.
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